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ABSTRACT
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) has attracted considerable
interest in recent years, prompting the development of the stan-
dardized XML-based language XACML. ABAC policies written in
languages like XACML have a tree-like structure, where leaf nodes
are associated with authorization decisions and non-leaf nodes
are associated with decision-combining algorithms. However, it
may be difficult in XACML to construct a given policy due to the
tree-structured nature of XACML and the way in which combining
algorithms are defined. Furthermore, there is limited control over
how requests are evaluated with respect to targets.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of an attribute expression,
which generalizes the notion of a target, and show how attribute
expressions are used to specify policies in tabular form. We demon-
strate why representing policies in this manner is convenient, in-
tuitive and flexible for policy authors, and provide a method for
automatically compiling policy tables into machine-enforceable
policies. Thus, we bridge the gap between a policy representation
that is convenient for end-users and a policy that can be enforced
by a PDP. We then describe various methods to reduce the size of
policy tables.
In addition, we compare our language with XACML, highlighting
various shortcomings of XACML and demonstrating how to express
XACML policies in a tabular form. We then show how policy tables
can be used as leaf nodes in a tree-structured language, providing a
modular method for constructing enterprise-wide policies. Finally,
we show how attribute expressions and policy tables can be used to
make role-based access control and access control lists “attribute-
aware”.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Access control restricts the interactions that are possible between
users (or programs operating under the control of users) and sensi-
tive resources, and is an essential security service in any multi-user
computing system. The most common means of implementing ac-
cess control is to define an authorization policy, specifying which re-
quests (that is, attempted user-resource interactions) are authorized
and can thus be allowed. In a typical implementation, all requests
are intercepted and evaluated with respect to the policy by trusted
software components, often known as the policy enforcement point
and policy decision point, respectively.
Thus, in general terms, an authorization policy is a function
P : Q → D, where Q is the set of requests and D is the set of autho-
rization decisions. We assume 0 and 1 belong to D, representing
the “deny” and “allow” decisions, respectively. Traditionally, Q was
modeled as a set of triples of the form (s,o,a), where s is a subject, o
is an object, and a is an action: a subject represents an authenticated
entity, an object represents a protected resource, and an action is
the means by which the subject wishes to interact with the object.
In recent years, we have seen the emergence of attribute-based
access control, in part to cater for open, distributed computing en-
vironments where it is not necessarily possible to authenticate all
entities directly. Instead, subjects and objects are associated with
attributes, requests are collections of attributes associated with
the subjects and objects, and these attributes determine whether a
request is authorized or not. Thus we may imagine representing a
policy as a table in which columns are indexed by attributes, rows
represent the presence or otherwise of the respective attribute in a
request, with the final column in the table indicating the authoriza-
tion decision associated with a particular collection of attributes.
A simple example is shown in Figure 1, where 1 indicates the
presence of the attribute in the request and 0 indicates the attribute
is absent; the dash indicates that the presence or otherwise of a
particular attribute is irrelevant to the decision. Thus the first row
of the table indicates that the deny decision (0) should be returned
if attributes a1 and a2 are present in a request. If no row exists for
a particular combination, then we assume that the decision is ⊥
(“not-applicable”); that is, the policy is “silent” for such a request
and does not return a conclusive decision. Thus, for example, the
decision is ⊥ if attribute a1 is not present in the request.
While it is certainly convenient and intuitive to represent au-
thorization policies in tabular form, this representation is not com-
patible with many languages that have been developed for writing
attribute-based authorization policies. XACML [11], PTaCL [6] and
PBel [5], for example, are “tree-structured” languages, where poli-
cies are, essentially, terms in a logic-based formalism. These terms
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a1 a2 a3 d
1 1 − 0
1 0 1 1
Figure 1: A simple policy table
may be represented by trees, in which leaf nodes are attribute-
decision pairs and interior nodes are attribute-operator pairs.1
Figure 2 illustrates the policy ((a1,do), ((a2,0), (a3,1))). In this
case, the operator do represents the “deny-overrides” operator. A
request is evaluated by first pruning the nodes that are not matched
by the attributes in the request. Then the decisions in the remaining
leaf nodes are combined using the policy combining operator(s). If,
for example, all attributes are present in a request (so no pruning is
performed), then the resulting decision is 0 do 1 = 0, corresponding
to the first line in Figure 1.
(a2,0) (a3,1)
(a1,do)
Figure 2: A simple tree-structured policy
In fact, the tree in Figure 2 represents an equivalent policy to the
one tabulated in Figure 1, although this is not immediately apparent.
It is this gap – between (i) how one is likely to conceive of a policy,
and (ii) how one must construct the policy using existing languages
for attribute-based access control – that provides the motivation
for the work in this paper.
A further shortcoming of existingwork on languages for attribute-
based access control is the way in which requests and attributes
are matched. Suppose we have an attribute name-value pair (n,v )
and a request that contains multiple name-value pairs, including
(n,v ) and (n,v ′), where v ′ , v . Then one might argue the request
matches the attribute (since it contains (n,v )); on the other hand,
one might argue it doesn’t match the attribute (since it also contains
(n,v ′)). XACML always assumes the former interpretation, which
may be inappropriate if, for example, the policy author wishes to
insist that the request contains exactly one name-value pair for
the named attribute. Although PTaCL has a slightly more com-
plex match semantics for requests and attributes, it ignores several
possible match semantics that might be relevant in practice.
In this paper, we use prior work on canonical completeness to
develop a new way of defining authorization policies using policy
tables. In doing so, we support all possible match semantics for
an attribute and request, thereby facilitating much greater control
over policy specification. We then show how such tables can be
automatically compiled into machine-enforceable policies. Thus,
we are able to bridge the gap between a policy representation
that is convenient for end-users and a policy that can be enforced
1This is something of a simplification, but is a good approximation of how such policies
are structured.
by a PDP. We also demonstrate that policy tables can be used as
the leaf nodes in a tree-structured language, thereby facilitating
the modular construction of enterprise-wide policies. Finally, we
show how such policy tables can be used to enhance existing access
control paradigms, such as access control lists and role-based access
control, by making them “attribute-aware”.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• the introduction of “attribute expressions” and match se-
mantics for attribute based requests;
• the specification of a new policy authorization language
AEPL, which represents policies as tables and provides
a method for automatically converting policy tables into
machine-enforceable policies;
• an overview of various policy compression methods which
can be applied to AEPL policy tables;
• a method for converting tree-structured XACML policies
into policy tables; and
• a demonstration of the various applications of AEPL, in
enhancing existing paradigms such as access control lists
and role-based access control.
In the following section we provide a brief introduction to canon-
ical completeness for lattice-based logics, along with the specifica-
tion of a 4-valued canonically complete logic [8], which we will use
as the underlying logic for AEPL. In Section 3 we define the syntax
and semantics of attribute expressions, along with a justification
for why they are preferable to the use of traditional targets (found
in XACML [11] and PTaCL [6]). Then, we specify the AEPL lan-
guage, showing how policies are constructed as tables, and describe
a method for automatically converting these tables into machine-
enforceable policies. In Section 4, we investigate various methods
for reducing the size of AEPL policy tables. We then discuss the
limitations of targets in XACML, and demonstrate how an XACML
policy can be converted into a policy table in Section 5. Section 6
discusses methods to build complex policies, enabling distributed
specification and evaluation of policy tables, and ways to integrate
policy tables with role-based access control and access control lists.
We conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions and
suggest ideas for future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
We focus our attention on 4-valued logics (and policy languages),
where the set of decisions D is equal to {0,1,⊥,⊤}, corresponding
to the authorization decisions “deny”, “allow”, “not-applicable” and
“conflict”, respectively [5, 10, 13]. In the context of decisions that
arise from policy evaluation, we interpret 0 as a “deny” decision,
1 as “allow”, ⊥ as “not-applicable” and ⊤ as “conflict”. We assume
D is furnished with a partial ordering ⩽ such that (D,⩽) is a lat-
tice, perhaps the most well-known logic of this kind being Belnap
logic [4].
We begin with a brief introduction of Belnap logic in Section 2.1.
Then, we summarize recent work by Crampton and Williams [8] in
Section 2.2, which extends Jobe’s [9] notions of canonical suitability,
selection operators and canonical completeness to lattice-based
logics, and their applications to attribute-based policy authorization
languages.
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We conclude the related work section with a description of a
lattice-based 4-valued canonically complete logic [8]. (For discus-
sion on the use of a 4-valued decision set and lattice-based logics in
access control the reader is the referred to the literature [5, 10, 13])
2.1 Belnap logic
Belnap logic [4] is one of the most well-known lattice-based logics,
and has been used as the formal basis for authorization languages
such as PBel [5], Rumpole [10] and BelLog [13]. It was developed
with the intention of defining ways to handle inconsistent and in-
complete information in a formal manner and uses the truth values
0, 1, ⊥, and ⊤, representing “false”, “true”, “lack of information” and
“too much information”, respectively. In the remainder of this paper,
we will denote the four valued decision set {⊥,0,1,⊤} by 4.
The set of truth values in Belnap’s logic admits two orderings:
a truth ordering ⩽t and a knowledge ordering ⩽k . In the truth
ordering ⩽t , 0 is the minimum element and 1 is the maximum
element, while ⊥ and ⊤ are incomparable indeterminate values. In
the knowledge ordering ⩽k , ⊥ is the minimum element, ⊤ is the
maximum element while 0 and 1 are incomparable. Both (4,⩽t )
and (4,⩽k ) are lattices, forming the interlaced bilattice illustrated
in Figure 3.
t
k
⊥
0 1
⊤
Figure 3: The 4 truth values in Belnap logic
We will assume the use of the knowledge ordering throughout
this paper. The intuition is that ⊥ (“not-applicable”) represents no
conclusive decision is possible because of lack of knowledge, while
0 and 1 are (incomparable) conclusive decisions, and ⊤ corresponds
to too much knowledge because of conflicting conclusive decisions.
2.2 Canonical completeness
We now define canonical suitability, functional completeness, se-
lection operators, normal form and canonical completeness for
lattice-based logics [8].
Let L = (V ,Ops) be a logic associated with a lattice (V ,⩽) of
truth values and a set of logical operators Ops. We omitV and Ops
when no ambiguity can occur. We write Φ(L) to denote the set of
formulae that can be written in the logic L.
We say L is canonically suitable if and only if there exist formu-
lae ϕmax and ϕmin of arity 2 in Φ(L) such that ϕmax (x ,y) returns
sup{x ,y} and ϕmin (x ,y) returns inf{x ,y}. If a logic is canonically
suitable, we will write ϕmax (x ,y) and ϕmin (x ,y) using infix binary
operators as x ⋎ y and x ⋏ y, respectively.
A function f : V n → V is completely specified by a truth table
containing n columns andmn rows. However, not every truth table
can be represented by a formula in a given logic L = (V ,Ops). L is
said to be functionally complete if for every function f : V n → V ,
there is a formula ϕ ∈ Φ(L) of arity n whose evaluation corre-
sponds to the truth table. In this sense, XACML is not functionally
complete [7], while PTaCL [6] and PBel [5] are.
Letv denote the minimum value in (V ,⩽). (Such a value must ex-
ist in a finite lattice.)Wewill write a to denote the tuple (a1, . . . ,an ) ∈
V n when no confusion can occur. Then, for a ∈ V n , the n-ary selec-
tion operator S ja is defined as follows:
S
j
a (x) =

j if x = a,
v otherwise.
Note Sva (x ) = v for all a,x ∈ V n . Illustrative examples of unary
and binary selection operators (for Belnap logic) are shown in
Figure 4.
x S00 (x ) S
⊤
1 (x )
⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0 0 ⊥
1 ⊥ ⊤
⊤ ⊥ ⊥
y
S0
(1,⊤) (x ,y) ⊥ 0 1 ⊤
x
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Figure 4: Examples of selection operators in Belnap Logic
Selection operators play a central role in the development of
canonically complete logics because an arbitrary function f : V n →
V can be expressed in terms of selection operators. Consider, for
example, the function
f (x ,y) =

⊤ if x = 0, y = 1,
0 if x = y = 0,
1 if x = 1, y = ⊥,
⊥ otherwise.
Then it is easy to confirm that
f (x ,y) ≡ S⊤(0,1) (x ,y) ⋎ S0(0,0) (x ,y) ⋎ S1(1,⊥) (x ,y).
Moreover, Sc
(a,b ) (x ,y) ≡ Sca (x ) ⋏Scb (y) for any a,b,c,x ,y ∈ V . Thus,
f (x ,y) ≡ (S⊤0 (x ) ⋏ S⊤1 (y)) ⋎ (S00 (x ) ⋏ S00 (y)) ⋎ (S11 (x ) ⋏ S1⊥ (y))
In other words, we can express f as the “disjunction” (⋎) of “con-
junctions” (⋏) of unary selection operators.
More generally, given the truth table of function f : V n → V ,
we can write down an equivalent function in terms of selection
operators. Specifically, let
A =
{
a ∈ V n : f (a) > ⊥} ;
then, for all x ∈ V n ,
f (x) =
j
a∈A
S
f (x)
a (x).
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Jobe established a number of results connecting the functional
completeness of a logic with the unary selection operators, summa-
rized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Jobe [9, Theorems 1, 2; Lemma 1]). A logic L is
functionally complete if and only if each unary selection operator is
equivalent to some formula in L.
The normal form of formula ϕ in a canonically suitable logic is a
formula ϕ ′ that has the same truth table as ϕ and has the following
properties:
• the only binary operators it contains are ⋎ and ⋏;
• no binary operator is included in the scope of a unary
operator;
• no instance of ⋎ occurs in the scope of the ⋏ operator.
A canonically suitable logic is canonically complete if every unary
selection operator can be expressed in normal form. Crampton
and Williams showed that there are considerable advantages to
using a canonically complete logic as the basis for an authorization
language [7]. In particular, it will often be easier to specify policies
using a language based on a canonically complete logic and such
policies can be compiled automatically into a normal form.
2.3 A 4-valued canonically complete logic
While Belnap logic is known to be functionally complete [3], Cramp-
ton and Williams [8] showed it is not canonically complete, essen-
tially because only one unary operator (negation ¬) is defined.
Crampton and Williams developed a new set of operators based on
the knowledge ordering (4,⩽k ), which produced a canonically com-
plete 4-valued logic. For brevity, henceforth we denote the lattice
(4,⩽k ) by 4k .
They defined two new unary operators − and ⋄ whose truth
tables are shown in Figure 5a: − swaps the values of ⊥ and ⊤;
⋄ permutes the values ⊥,0,1 and ⊤. In addition, they reused the
operator ⊗ which acts as the meet operation (⋏) for the lattice 4k ,
whose truth table is shown in Figure 5b. We represent this logic
using the notation L(4k , {−,⋄,⊗}).
d −d ⋄d
⊥ ⊤ 0
0 0 1
1 1 ⊤
⊤ ⊥ ⊥
(a) − and ⋄
⊗ ⊥ 0 1 ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0 ⊥ 0 ⊥ 0
1 ⊥ ⊥ 1 1
⊤ ⊥ 0 1 ⊤
(b) ⊗
Figure 5: Canonically complete operators
Crampton and Williams [8] used the logic L(4k , {−,⋄,⊗}) as a
basis for the policy authorization language PTaCL⩽4 , highlighting
the numerous advantages that can be gained in using a canonically
complete logic as the underlying logic, opposed to other languages
such as PBel [5] which use the canonically incomplete Belnap logic.
Accordingly, we will use the logic L(4k , {−,⋄,⊗}) as the underlying
logic when we develop our new policy authorization language.
3 THE AEPL LANGUAGE
As we noted in the introduction, an authorization policy may be
represented as a function P : Q → D, whereQ is the set of requests
and D is the set of decisions. In other words, P (q) represents the
result of evaluating policy P for request q, thereby determining
whether q is authorized by policy P .
In attribute-based access control, a request is assumed to be a
set of name-value pairs, where a name is an attribute and a value
is taken from some domain over which the binary relations =, ,,
<, ⩽, > and ⩾ are defined. We assume it is possible to determine
whether a pair of values belongs to a given relation efficiently. In
particular, we assume henceforth that all attribute values are strings
of bounded length defined over some alphabet Σ.
It is usually impossible to specify an attribute-based policy P
by specifying a decision for every possible request, given the size
of the domain of P . Thus, it is usual to specify P in terms of the
relationship between a policy and the attribute name-value pairs
that constitute a request. This relationship is typically expressed
in terms of “targets”, which are predicates specified in terms of
attributes values and whose truth values are determined by com-
paring the attribute values specified in the target with those present
in the request.
3.1 Attribute expressions
Our attribute-expression policy language, AEPL, is based on the
idea of an attribute expression. Informally, the input to P is a tuple
of logical values, and those values are determined by “matching”
a request to a set of attribute expressions. More formally, we de-
fine an attribute expression to be a tuple (n,v,∼,⊕), where n is an
attribute name, v is an attribute value or regular expression, ∼
is an associative, commutative, binary relation, and ⊕ is a binary
operator.
Given a binary relation R defined over some domainV , we write
R to denote the complement of R: that is (a,b) ∈ R iff (a,b) < R.
We will usually write R as an infix relation ∼ and R as ≁. Typical
examples of R and R include = and ,, < and ≮ (that is, ⩾).
In many cases, v will be an attribute value and ∼ will be a com-
parison operator, such as equality or greater-than. However, the
use of regular expressions means that more complex attribute ex-
pressions may be defined. Given a regular expression e (defined
over Σ), let L (e ) denote the set of strings that match e . Then we
define ∼e to be the set of pairs {(e,w ) : w ∈ L (e )}. Moreover, for
any regular expression e , there exists a regular expression e , the
complement of e , such thatw < L (e ) if and only ifw ∈ L (e ).
In the interests of clarity of exposition, we will assume hence-
forth that ∼ is always = (corresponding to exact string matching).
Note that this does not affect the generality of our approach: we
only require that it is efficient to determine whether a pair belongs
to the relation ∼.
The operator ⊕ determines the result of evaluating a request in
which some name-value pairs match the attribute expression and
some don’t. (This contrasts with the approach taken in XACML
and PTaCL.) We discuss this in more detail in Section 3.2.
We define three binary operators in Figure 6: ∨ and ∧ are de-
fined on the set {0,1,⊥}; and ! is defined on {0,1,⊥,⊤}. Since ⊕ is
Attribute Expressions, Policy Tables and
Attribute-Based Access Control SACMAT’17, , June 21–23, 2017, Indianapolis, IN, USA
associative and commutative, the expression
(. . . ((x1 ⊕ x2) ⊕ x3) ⊕ · · · ⊕ xk−1) ⊕ xk )
may be written without ambiguity as
⊕k
i=1 xi .
∧ ⊥ 0 1
⊥ ⊥ 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
∨ ⊥ 0 1
⊥ ⊥ 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
! ⊥ 0 1 ⊤
⊥ ⊥ 0 1 ⊤
0 0 0 ⊤ ⊤
1 1 ⊤ 1 ⊤
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
Figure 6: Binary operators for attribute expressions
3.2 Evaluating requests
A request is a set of name-value pairs of the form (n,v ). The eval-
uation of a request q = {(n1,v1), . . . , (nℓ ,vℓ )} with respect to an
attribute expression α = (n,v,∼,⊕) is denoted by eval(q,α ). Infor-
mally, eval(q,α ) is determined by combining the results of evaluat-
ing the elements of the request (ni ,vi ) using ⊕. More formally, we
define:
eval(∅, (n,v,∼,⊕)) = ⊥m;
eval(
{
(n′,v ′)} , (n,v,∼,⊕)) =

1m if n = n′ and v ∼ v ′,
0m if n = n′ and v ≁ v ′,
⊥m otherwise.
We say a name-value pair (n′,v ′) matches an attribute expression
α if eval({(n′,v ′)} ,α ) = 1m; and we say (n′,v ′) does not match
α if eval({(n′,v ′)} ,α ) = 0m. Throughout this section, we use the
subscript m (for “match”) to denote explicitly logical values that
arise from the evaluation of attribute expressions (request matches).
In Section 3.3, we use the subscript d to denote logical values that
arise from policy evaluation (authorization decisions). When no
ambiguity can occur we will omit the subscripts.
A request q = {(n1,v1), . . . , (nℓ ,vℓ )} may contain two name-
value pairs, one of which matches α = (n,v,∼,⊕) and one which
doesn’t. The choice of operator ⊕ determines how the results of
the matches will be combined. Formally, we have
eval(q, (n,v,∼,⊕)) =
k⊕
i=1
eval({(ni ,vi )} , (n,v,∼,⊕)).
Thus, we have the following possibilities.
• eval(q, (n,v,∼,∨)) = 1m if there exists i such that
eval((ni ,vi ), (n,v,∼,∨)) = 1m; in other words, if the re-
quest contains at least one name-value pair that matches
the attribute expression.
• eval(q, (n,v,∼,∧)) = 0m if there exists i such that
eval((ni ,vi ), (n,v,∼,∧)) = 0m; in other words, if the re-
quest contains at least one name-value pair that does not
match the attribute expression.
• eval(q, (n,v,∼, !)) = ⊤m, indicating conflict, if there ex-
ist i and j such that eval((ni ,vi ), (n,v,∼, !)) = 0m and
eval((nj ,vj ), (n,v,∼, !)) = 1m.
It is worth noting that neither XACML nor PTaCL provide this
level of control over how a request is evaluated with respect to a
target (the concept analogous to an attribute expression). Roughly
speaking, target evaluation in both languages only returns 0m or
1m and (effectively) always assumes the use of ∨ when a request
contains attribute values that both match and don’t match a target.
3.3 AEPL policies
A policy in AEPL is a pair P = (A(P ),F (P )), where
• A(P ) = {α1, . . . ,αℓ } is a set of attribute expressions,
• Di ⊆ {⊥m,0m,1m,⊤m} is the range of values that eval(q,αi )
can take, and
• F : D1 × · · · × Dℓ → {⊥d,0d,1d,⊤d} is a function.
Then we define:
P (q) = F (eval(q,α1), . . . ,eval(q,αℓ )).
We will write A and F for A(P ) and F (P ), respectively,
when P is clear from context. We will also write eval(q,A) for
eval(q,α1), . . . ,eval(q,αℓ ) where no confusion can occur.
We may visualize F as a table having ℓ + 1 columns. The first ℓ
columns are indexed by the attribute expressions in A. The entries
in the ith column are the possible values that eval(q,αi ) can take.
The final entry in the row with entries d1, . . . ,dℓ is F (d1, . . . ,dℓ ).
In other words, policies are defined in the form suggested in the
introduction and illustrated in Figure 1. Thus we specify an AEPL
policy in two steps: define the relevant attribute expressions; and
then define the policy table. Note that a policy is defined directly in
terms of the match relationships that exist between the elements
of a request and the policy’s attribute expressions.
In the remainder of the paper, we use an example of a simple
policy containing two attribute expressions. Let Pex = (Aex,Fex) be
a policy, where
Aex = {α1,α2} = {(n1,v1,=,∧), (n2,v2,=,∧)}
and Fex is defined in Figure 7.
x1 = eval(q,α1) x2 = eval(q,α2) Pex (x1,x2)
⊥m ⊥m ⊥d
⊥m 0m ⊥d
⊥m 1m 1d
0m ⊥m 0d
0m 0m 0d
0m 1m 0d
1m ⊥m 1d
1m 0m 0d
1m 1m 1d
Figure 7: Policy function defined as a table
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The decisions in the final column of Figure 7 are determined
by the policy author, for each combination of attribute expression
matches. This allows for precise specification of how the policy Pex
should behave under each different attribute expression evaluation
outcome and differs significantly from the evaluation of targets in
XACML and PTaCL. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.
3.4 Policies in normal form
Crampton and Williams [7] extended work by Jobe [9] to develop
a method for converting arbitrary tables representing functions of
the form F : Dn → D, where D is the set of values in a multi-valued
logic, into an equivalent logical formula using selection operators.
We now show how this method can be applied to AEPL policies to
generate standardized policy representations that can be evaluated
automatically.
We writeD to denote D1 × · · · ×Dℓ . Given (x1, . . . ,xℓ ) ∈ D, we
will write xwhere no ambiguity can occur. For each row in the table
representing F , we may construct an equivalent logical formula
comprising a “disjunction” of selection operators. Specifically, if
F (a) = d for a ∈ D, then, we may write this as Sda (x). Let D+ =
{x ∈ D : F (x) , ⊥}. Then
F (x) =
∨
a∈D+
Sda (x) and Sd(a1, ...,aℓ ) (x) ≡
ℓ∧
i=1
Sdai .
Hence F may be represented as a disjunction of conjunctions of
unary selection operators [8].
Consider Fex, and let x1 = eval(q,α1) and x2 = eval(q,α2). Then,
we may express the policy Pex (q) = Fex (x1,x2) as a disjunction of
selection operators:
Fex (x1,x2) ≡ S⊥(⊥,⊥) (x1,x2) ⋎ S⊥(⊥,0) (x1,x2) ⋎ S1(⊥,1) (x1,x2)
⋎ S0(0,⊥) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
0
(0,0) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
0
(0,1) (x1,x2)
⋎ S1(1,⊥) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
0
(1,0) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
1
(1,1) (x1,x2).
This, in turn, may be represented as a disjunction of conjunctions
of unary selection operators (as described above).
Furthermore, Crampton and Williams have derived expressions
for the unary selection operators in terms of the operators {−,⋄,⊗}
(see Appendix A). Hence, we can derive a formula in normal form
for the policy Pex = (Aex,Fex). Of course, one would not usually
construct the normal form by hand, as we have done above. Indeed,
Crampton and Williams [8] have developed an algorithm which
takes an arbitrary policy expressed as a table as input, and outputs
the equivalent normal form expressed in terms of the operators
{−,⋄,⊗}.
3.5 AEPL policy trees
An AEPL policy is a pair (A,F ). While this method of policy spec-
ification provides an intuitive and flexible method for defining
policies, it will not scale to situations where many attribute expres-
sions need to be specified and evaluated. In this case, it makes sense
to use the policy-combining operators found in XACML and other
tree-structured authorization languages to combine the results of
evaluating multiple policies, each using a small number of attribute
expressions. Thus, the set of attribute expressions in each policy
will act in the same way as a target in a language like XACML.
In this section we revise the syntax and semantics for policy
evaluation of the tree-structured ABAC language PTaCL⩽4 [8]. We
use the operators −,⋄ and ⊗ from PTaCL⩽4 (defined in Section 2.3)
and demonstrate how policies of the form (A,F ) can be used in tree-
structured policies, and how we may replace targets with attribute
expressions.
We define an attribute expression based target, or simply an AE-
target, to be a pair (A,T ), whereA = {α1, . . . ,αℓ } is a set of attribute
expressions and T ⊆ D1 × · · · × Dℓ , where Di is the set of values
that eval(q,αi ) can take. If q is a request andT is an AE-target such
that eval(q,A) ∈ T then q is said to match T .
Given an AEPL policy P = (A,F ), then P , ⋄P and −P are AEPL
policy trees, where
(⋄P ) (q) def= ⋄(P (q)) and (−P ) (q) def= −(P (q)).
If P1 and P2 are AEPL policy trees and T is an AE-target, then
(T ,P1 ⊗ P2) is a AEPL policy tree, where
(T ,P1 ⊗ P2) (q) def=

P1 (q) ⊗ P2 (q) if eval(q,A) ∈ T ,
⊥ otherwise.
The ability to use AEPL policies (A,F ) as leaf nodes (atomic
policies) in AEPL policy trees provides us with a number of ad-
vantages (over PTaCL⩽4 ). We get the additional expressive power
of policy specification for leaf nodes, together with the full power
and functional completeness of PTaCL⩽4 . By facilitating high-level
operators in addition to specifying policies via a policy table and
attribute expressions, we provide a hybrid means of constructing
policies, which can be both bottom-up and top-down. This provides
a great deal of flexibility and expressivity for policy authors. We
can support low level policies specified by functions, and merge
the policies using high-level policy operators. In addition, we have
greater control of the applicability of policies due to the use of
targets based on attribute expression (over “traditional” targets in
PTaCL⩽4 ). We discuss PTaCL
⩽
4 targets and their limitations in more
depth in Section 5.2.
4 POLICY COMPRESSION
While representing a policy P as a pair (A,F ) is more concise and
an easier task than specifying a decision for every possible request,
the policy tables will be large when many attribute expressions
are involved. To tackle this problem, we now investigate methods
for policy compression, with the aim of reducing the size of these
policy tables.
4.1 Removing redundancies
We begin with the following two remarks about methods for merg-
ing and omitting rows from policy tables.
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Remark 1. Suppose F (a,x2) = d for all x2 ∈ D2, as illustrated in
the policy table fragment below.
x1 x2 P (x1,x2)
a ⊥ d
a 0 d
a 1 d
a ⊤ d
Then it is easy to show that
Sd(a,⊥) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
d
(a,0) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
d
(a,1) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
d
(a,⊤) (x1,x2)
is equivalent to Sda (x1). (This equivalence is formally established in
Table 14 in Appendix B.) And this may be represented in tabular form
as a single row, shown below, where we use − to signify that x2 can
take any value.
x1 x2 P (x1,x2)
a − d
Remark 2. We may omit any rows from the policy table in which
the final column contains the value ⊥. Recall
Sda (x) =

d if x = a,
⊥ otherwise.
Moreover, (⊥ ⋎ x ) = (x ⋎ ⊥) = x for all x ∈ {0,1,⊥,⊤}. Thus
Sd1a1 (x) ⋎ S
d2
a2 (x) ⋎ . . . ⋎ S
dn
an (x) = ⊥,
except when x ∈ {a1, . . . ,an}.
Thus, we may assume the policy returns ⊥ if the table does not
contain an entry for a particular tuple x. In this case, we say the
policy is not applicable for any request q such that eval(q,A) = x.
Returning to our example policy Pex, we apply the results from
the remarks above to reduce the size of the policy table which
defines the function Fex. First, note that
Fex (0,⊥) = Fex (0,0) = Fex (0,1) = 0.
Thus, by Remark 1, we may merge these three rows into a single
row, represented by Fex (0,−) = 0. In addition, by Remark 2, we
may omit the rows Fex (⊥,⊥) and Fex (⊥,0) since they contain ⊥ in
the final column. Hence, we have the reduced policy table shown
in Figure 8.
x1 = eval(q,α1) x2 = eval(q,α2) Pex (x1,x2)
⊥m 1m 1
0m − 0
1m ⊥m 1
1m 0m 0
1m 1m 1
Figure 8: Reduced policy table
Expressing the policy Pex (q) = Fex (x1,x2) as a disjunction of
selection operators, we have
Fex (x1,x2) ≡ S1(⊥,1) (x1,x2) ⋎ S00 (x1) ⋎ S1(1,⊥) (x1,x2) ⋎
S0(1,0) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
1
(1,1) (x1,x2).
We may apply Remark 1 directly during policy specification. If,
for example, a policy author decides during the construction of a
policy table that if x1 = 0 then the value of x2 is irrelevant, the
policy should return 0 (the case in our example). In other words, we
can, if desired, directly encode a deny-overrides or allow-overrides
in the policy table when certain attribute expressions are matched
or not matched. And we can allow the policy author to use − as
syntactic sugar for a “decision” in the policy table, thereby saving
the policy author from entering multiple rows (as seen in Figure 7).
4.2 Policies as Boolean functions
We now demonstrate that it is possible to reduce certain policies
to Boolean functions. Specifically, if F (x) ∈ {0,1} for all x ∈ D,
then we can eliminate the values ⊥ and ⊤ from the policy table. In
particular, we may replace an attribute expression α = (n,v,∼,⊕)
with two simpler attribute expressions α1 = (n,v,∼) and α2 =
(n,v,≁). We then encode the semantics of ⊕ directly in a policy
table only containing 0s and 1s.
Consider the example in Table 9. There are four values in the
decision setD = {⊥,0,1,⊤}, and there are four unique combinations
of 0 and 1, represented by the four rows in Table 9b. Each of these
values arises because of matches or the absence of matches, thus
allowing us to encode the semantics of ⊕ directly in a policy table
only containing 0s and 1s.
(n,v,∼, !) F
⊥ 0
0 0
1 1
⊤ 0
(a) Policy containing ⊥ and ⊤
(n,v,∼) (n,v,≁) F
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
(b) Policy using only 0 and 1
Figure 9: Converting a simple policy into a Boolean function
There are a number of advantages in expressing an attribute
expression α = (n,v,∼,⊕) as a combination of two attribute expres-
sions (n,v,∼) and (n,v,≁) and encoding the semantics of ⊕ directly.
In particular, the resulting policy table contains only binary values.
Hence, we may employ existing techniques for Boolean function
minimization [2].
5 COMPARISONWITH XACML AND PTACL
Having defined the AEPL policy authorization language, we now
provide a brief summary of XACML and compare it with AEPL.
We discuss the limitations of targets in XACML and PTaCL, before
showing how XACML rules and policies may be represented in
AEPL. We conclude by showing how an XACML policy set may be
represented using a single AEPL policy.
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5.1 XACML targets
AnXACML target, like an attribute expression, is expressed in terms
of attribute name-value pairs. It is used to determine whether a
rule, a policy or a policy set is applicable to a request.
A target is defined in terms of AllOf and AnyOf elements. The
AllOf element is used to group such pairs. Such an element is
“matched” by a request if the request matches each of the name-
value pairs. The AnyOf element is used to group AllOf elements.
Such an element is matched if any one of the AllOf elements is
matched. Evaluation of an XACML target returns one of two values
(“matched” or “not-matched”), unlike the evaluation of an attribute
expression.
Moreover, evaluation of an XACML target disregards whether
a request contains a name-value pair that doesn’t match a target
if it also contains a name-value pair that does match. In other
words, XACML provides less control over target evaluation than
our approach for the evaluation of attribute expressions.
5.2 PTaCL targets
A PTaCL target is defined to be a tuple (n,v, f ), where n is an
attribute name, v is an attribute value and f is a binary predicate.
The key difference between PTaCL targets and attribute expressions,
comes in the choice of the binary operator ⊕ present in attribute
expressions. Attribute expressions allow this operator to be selected
from the set {∧,∨, !}, dependent on the way in which conflicting
attribute values should be handled. Targets in PTaCL implicitly
assume that the operator ∨ is always used. This makes it impossible
to distinguish scenarios where there are two name value pairs
(n′,v ′) and (n′′,v ′′) such that n = n′,v = v ′ and n = n′′,v , v ′′.
Furthermore, PTaCL targets, much like XACML targets, are unable
to return ⊤. Hence, our attribute expressions are more expressive,
and provide greater control over their evaluation compared to the
evaluation of targets in PTaCL.
5.3 XACML rules
An XACML rule is specified by a target t and a decision d (known
as the “effect” of the rule in XACML), which may be either “allow”
or “deny”. The evaluation of a rule for a given request returns d
if the request matches the target and “not-applicable” otherwise.
Thus, an XACML rule may be encoded as a particularly simple
policy table. Specifically:
• each AllOf element is encoded as a row in the table, in
which the last entry is always d ; and
• the AnyOf element is encoded by the different rows in the
table.
Clearly, our policy tables can encode more general structures
than XACML rules. Informally, a policy table would have to be
encoded using two XACML rules, one for the rows for which the
decision is 1 and one for the rows for which the decision is 0. Even
so, such an encoding could not, for example, return ⊤. In other
words, AEPL provides a richer framework than the target-decision
paradigm for specifying the “leaf” policies in tree-structured lan-
guages such as XACML or PTaCL.
5.4 XACML policies
We now illustrate how attribute expressions can be used to encode
an entire XACML policy set directly. Consider the tree-structured
policy P illustrated in Figure 10, where dov and pov represent
the XACML deny-overrides and permit-overrides combining al-
gorithms respectively. This policy tree represents a XACML policy
set (t1,dov) which contains one policy (t3,po) one rule (t2,0); and
the policy (t3,pov) in turn contains two rules (t4,1) and (t5,0)2. We
assume for simplicity that each target is a single name-attribute
pair. In Section 6.1 we explain how we can extend our method of
specifying a policy as a pair (A,F ) to more complex scenarios.
(t5,0)(t4,1)
(t3,pov) (t2,0)
(t1,dov)
Figure 10: A simple tree-structured policy
Then we can represent this policy as the following policy table,
which is created by considering every possible outcome of matching
requests to targets.Wewrite xi to denote eval(q,ti ), and− to signify
the value of eval(q,ti ) is irrelevant.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 P (q)
0 − − − − ⊥
1 1 − − − 0
1 0 0 − − ⊥
1 0 1 1 − 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 ⊥
Hence, P may be represented by the pair (A,F ), where A =
{t1,t2,t3,t4,t5} and F : {0,1}5 → {⊥,0,1} is defined in the table
above. Then
F (x1, . . . ,x5) ≡ S0(1,1) (x1,x2) ⋎ S1(1,0,1,1) (x1,x2,x3,x4) ⋎
S0(1,0,1,0,1) (x1,x2,x3,x4,x5).
Note that we need not include the selection operators S⊥0 (x1),
S⊥
(1,0,0) (x1,x2,x3) and S
⊥
(1,0,1,0,0) (x1,x2,x3,x4,x5) representing the
first, third and sixth rows, since the policy evaluates to ⊥ in these
rows.
The representation of the policy tree in Figure 10 can be reduced
to a simple policy table, which in turn is reduced into a formula
comprising just three selection operators. By expressing this policy
tree as a policy table, it is much easier for a policy author to un-
derstand how this policy will behave under each different result of
target evaluation. Furthermore, we have a simple formula that can
2This is a simplification in terms of the structure of XACML policy sets, policies and
rules but approximate enough for the sake of exposition. For explicit definitions the
reader is referred to the XACML standard [11].
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be automatically converted into a machine-enforceable policy and
evaluated by a PDP.
6 APPLICATIONS
We now demonstrate how complex policies can be built, enabling
distributed policy specification and evaluation (much as in XACML
and PTaCL). Furthermore, we explore how policy tables can be
used to enhance existing access control paradigms, such as role-
based access control and access control lists. Informally, in the first
case, we show that a set of attribute expressions in an AEPL policy
table (each of which evaluates to an element in {0,1,⊥,⊤}) may be
replaced with a set of policies. And in the second case, we show
that the policy decisions in an AEPL table can be replaced with a
set of role identifiers or similar.
6.1 Complex policies as tables
By specifying policies as a pair (A,F ), we implicitly restrict the
depth of policies (or policy trees) to one. However, this may not
be the way in which some policies are structured in the real world
(indeed, most policy trees in XACML have depth greater than one).
We now develop a method for constructing more complex policies
from simple AEPL policies, using the structure of simple policies as
a template. A complex policy P is a pair ({P1, . . . ,Pℓ } ,F ), where
Pi = (Ai ,Fi ) is a simple AEPL policy. We define
P (q) = F (P1 (q), . . . ,Pℓ (q)).
Now, instead of the columns of the policy table representing
the function F being indexed by attribute expressions, they are
indexed by policies. Each row represents a possible combination
of the values that may arise from the evaluation of the respective
policies P1, . . . ,Pn . Of course, each of these policies is itself defined
by a set of attribute expressions and function (Ai ,Fi ), which will
need to be specified and evaluated first. The policy P, much like
previous policies, can be automatically converted into a machine-
enforceable form via the use of selection operators. Hence, we
have developed a way in which to combine arbitrary policies into
machine-enforceable form. This approach can be easily scaled, pro-
viding the means to construct policies of any desired depth (much
in the same manner as XACML policies).
One of the main advantages in using this method for building
up complex policies, is the distributed nature in which it can be
applied. For instance, in a large organization, each department
could construct their own complex policy, which can be converted
into a tree. Each department’s policy can then become a node in
a bigger tree, and be combined with other policies through the
use of another policy table. A simple example of this is shown in
Figure 11, demonstrating how four individual policies P1,P2,P3 and
P4 produced by each department can be combined in a policy table
to create the overall organizations policy Porg.
This policy table can be specified by someone who understands
the complete policy structure of the organization and can place
adequate restrictions on the interactions of policies between depart-
ments. Constructing policies in this manner allows each department
to design their own specific policy, without the need to worry about
how their policy interacts with other department’s policies. The
P1 P2 P3 P4 Porg
d1 d2 d3 d4 dorg
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 11: Combining policies in another table
combination of policies is then moderated by a person who under-
stands the organization wide policy strategy. We believe this both
simplifies specification of complex corporate policies, and reduces
the likely number of misconfigurations and errors.
In addition to the distributed nature in which policies can be spec-
ified using the approach, policy evaluation may also be distributed.
In the real world it is common practice for multiple PDPs to be
deployed, and this architecture may be leveraged by our method
of specifying complex policies. For instance, imagine the scenario
where a central PDP is in charge of evaluating the organization’s
policy Porg. This central PDP may then delegate the evaluation of
policies P1, . . . ,P4 to other PDPs, and combine the resulting deci-
sions that are reported back by each PDP. There are many reasons
why distributing the evaluation of policies in this way could be
advantageous: (i) the load on the central PDP is reduced, (ii) free
or available PDPs are fully utilised, (iii) the evaluation time for
policies is reduced, and (iv) in some instances requests may even
be evaluated locally.
6.2 ABAC policies for RBAC
In role-based access control (RBAC) [12], we tend to assume that
users are authorized for roles on the basis of identity. With the
emergence of attribute-based access control, we have an alternative
option: authorizing users on the basis of their attributes. Al-Kahtani
and Sandhu [1] created a model for attribute-based user-role assign-
ment, in which an enterprise defines a set of rules that are triggered
to automatically assign roles to users. The motivation for a mech-
anism to do this, is to reduce the number of manual user-to-role
assignments that are required, which can become troublesome in
large environments such as utility companies and popular online
websites [1].
We now demonstrate how we can automatically assign roles
to users using policies in AEPL. Previously, authorization policies
were represented by a function P : Q → D, where Q is the set of
requests and D is the set of decisions. Now, we represent a role
assignment authorization policy by a function P : Q → R, where
Q is the set of requests and R is the set of roles. The function P is
used to determine how users are assigned to roles based on their
attributes. Consider the simple example for an attribute-role table
which assigns roles based on the attribute “age” for the purpose of
filtering age-restricted content, shown in Table 1 [1].
Let P be a policy which comprises of four attribute expressions
α1,α2,α3 and α4 where α1 = (age,3,≥),α2 = (age,11,≥),α3 =
(age,16,≥) and α4 = (age,18,≥)3, with policy function F , defined
in Figure 12.
3The choice of operator ⊕ is irrelevant in this example, since requests will not contain
two pairs (n,v ′) and (n,v ′′) such that n is age and v ′ , v ′′, hence we omit it.
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eval(q, (age,3,≥)) eval(q, (age,11,≥)) eval(q, (age,16,≥)) eval(q, (age,18,≥)) Role
1 0 0 0 Child
1 1 0 0 Juvenile
1 1 1 0 Adolescent
1 1 1 1 Adult
Figure 12: Policy table for attribute-based role assignment
Table 1: Age to role assignment
Age Role
≥ 3 Child
≥ 11 Juvenile
≥ 16 Adolescent
≥ 18 Adult
Hence, we have represented the age-to-role assignment as a pol-
icy P = (A,F ), which may in turn be represented as a combination
of selection operators and converted into a machine-enforceable
policy. It is easy to imagine how thismethodology could be extended
and applied in a setting where it is useful to automatically assign
roles to users on the basis of attributes rather than identity. Our
approach is scalable, simple for policy authors to understand and
can be applied with various other techniques discussed throughout
this paper such as ways to compress policies and using policies
as leaf nodes in tree-structured languages, to produce a machine-
enforceable policy which assigns roles to users.
6.3 Access control lists
In an access control system using access control lists based on
identifiers, a user is associatedwith one ormore identifiers: a unique
user identifier (UID) and zero or more group identifiers (GIDs). Each
object is associated with an access control list (ACL). Each ACL
may be modelled as a list of access control entries (ACEs), where an
ACE comprises an identifier and a set of authorized actions. Finally,
a request contains a UID and a set of GIDs, an object identifier
(OID) and a requested action. The UID and GIDs in the request
will be compared with those in the ACEs of the object’s ACL and a
decision will be reached based on the actions that are authorized
by the ACEs and those that have been requested.
We may extend this idea of identity-based ACLs to attribute-
based ACLs. Each ACE contains a group identifier, as before, which
represents an attribute-based policy. Then, we represent a group
membership policy as a function P : Q → G, were Q is the set of
requests andG is the set of group identifiers. The policy P specifies
the attributes that a user must have to be regarded as a member of
that group. We may represent this policy using a set of attribute
expressions A and a function F defined as a policy table, in an
identical manner to that illustrated in Section 6.2. Hence, we can
use AEPL to support attribute-based access control in a ACL-based
system.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The development and specification of attribute-based access con-
trol languages such as XACML [11], PTaCL [6] and PBel [5] will
continue to increase to meet the demand for open, distributed, inter-
connected and dynamic systems. While XACML is a standardized
language, constructing some policies may be difficult (and may be
impossible due to the functional incompleteness of XACML [7]),
and there is little support or guidance provided for policy authors.
This problem provides the primary motivation for this paper: the
development of a convenient and intuitive method for authoring
policies, which can be expressed in a form that may be easily eval-
uated by a PDP.
In this paper, we make important contributions to the develop-
ment of ABAC authorization languages. First, we define attribute
expressions, which provide greater control over how requests are
evaluated, compared to XACML [11] and PTaCL [6]. Then, we spec-
ify policies as tables, in which the columns are indexed by attribute
expressions. Defining policies in this manner is both simple and
intuitive, and allows policy authors to specify how a policy will
behave under each different evaluation of attribute expressions. In
XACML and other tree-structured languages, it can be difficult to
foresee how large policies will evaluate under different requests.
This can often lead to policy misconfigurations and errors. In ad-
dition, we demonstrate how policy tables may be automatically
compiled into machine-enforceable policies, and explore various
methods for policy compression, thus reducing the size of policy
tables.
Second, we compare XACML and PTaCL with AEPL, show-
ing that AEPL provides more control over target evaluation than
XACML and PTaCL. Furthermore, we show how an XACML pol-
icy can be converted into a policy table. By representing XACML
policies in a tabular form, it becomes easier for a policy author to
understand how policies will behave under each different result of
target evaluation. Finally, we demonstrate the various applications
of AEPL. We show how complex policies can be constructed as
tables, thus enabling a distributed method for building and evaluat-
ing enterprise-wide policies. We also show how policy tables can
be used in RBAC [12] and ACLs for role and group assignments
respectively, making these paradigms “attribute-aware”.
There is a considerable amount of future work which naturally
proceeds from the work in this paper. We plan to develop policy
authoring software that provides a graphical user interface for pol-
icy authors, allowing them to specify attribute expressions, and
construct a table for the desired policy. This table will then be auto-
matically converted into a machine-enforceable policy. Naturally,
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we hope to develop a modified XACML PDP that can evaluate at-
tribute expressions and the machine-enforceable policies produced
by policy authoring software at a PDP. There is also motivation to
develop a tool which converts a policy expressed as a tree-structured
policy into an equivalent policy table, much like the example in
Section 5.4. This will help facilitate the smooth transition from
XACML tree-structured policies to policies defined as tables. We
would also like to investigate how arbitrary conditions (found in
XACML) may be included in AEPL
We would also like to conduct a usability study to test the hy-
pothesis that the construction of AEPL policy tables is easier and
less error-prone than writing XACML policies. Our vision of this
study requires the participants to construct a policy presented in
natural language, first as a tree-structured XACML policy, and then
as a policy table in AEPL. We may then compare various elements
such as (i) the ease with which the testers could construct each
policy, (ii) whether the XACML and AEPL policy are equivalent,
(iii) the “correctness” of each policy (how close they are to the de-
scribed policy in natural language), and (iv) other metrics such as
the time taken to construct each policy.
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A UNARY SELECTION OPERATOR
ENCODINGS
Figure 13 shows the normal forms of the unary selection operators
Sba . Note that S⊥a (x ) = ⊥ for all a,x ∈ {0,1,⊥,⊤}.
S⊥a (x ) x ⋏ (⋄−x ) ⋏ (⋄−⋄−x )
S0⊥ (x ) ⋄(x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄x )
S00 (x ) x ⋏ (−x ) ⋏ (−⋄−x )
S01 (x ) (⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (⋄x )
S0⊤ (x ) (⋄−x ) ⋏ (−⋄−x ) ⋏ (⋄⋄−⋄x )
S1⊥ (x ) (⋄−⋄x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄x ) ⋏ (⋄⋄x )
S10 (x ) (⋄x ) ⋏ (−⋄x ) ⋏ (⋄−x )
S11 (x ) x ⋏ (−x ) ⋏ (⋄⋄−⋄x )
S1⊤ (x ) (⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (⋄⋄−x )
S⊤⊥ (x ) (−⋄−x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (−x )
S⊤0 (x ) (⋄−⋄−x ) ⋏ (⋄−⋄x ) ⋏ (⋄⋄x )
S⊤1 (x ) (⋄x ) ⋏ (⋄−x ) ⋏ (⋄−⋄⋄−⋄x )
S⊤⊤ (x ) x ⋏ (−⋄x ) ⋏ (−⋄−⋄x )
Figure 13: Normal forms for the unary selection operators
B EQUIVALENCE OF SELECTION
OPERATORS
Figure 14 establishes the following equivalence of Sda (x1) and
Sd(a,⊥) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
d
(a,0) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
d
(a,1) (x1,x2) ⋎ S
d
(a,⊤) (x1,x2).
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x1 x2 Sd(a,⊥) (x1,x2) S
d
(a,0) (x1,x2) S
d
(a,1) (x1,x2) S
d
(a,⊤) (x1,x2) S
d
a (x1)
a ⊥ d ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ d
a 0 ⊥ d ⊥ ⊥ d
a 1 ⊥ ⊥ d ⊥ d
a ⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ d d
Figure 14: Equivalence of selection operators
